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HON. EDWIN W. TOMPKINS*
An incomprehensible contradiction occurred in the year 1955. While there
was much agitation to enact laws to curb and prevent wire-tapping of individuals,
including suspected and known criminals and subversives,1 there was at the same
time wire-tapping being done under the guise of reform (maybe), exploitation
(perhaps), which threatened the very foundations of American Jurisprudence, and
the freedom and liberty of our people.
We have often heard it said "It can't happen here", but as summarized in
U. S. News & World Report:
2
"The latest 'reform' movements involves 'wire tapping' of jury
rooms.
"Tapped wires and wire recordings gave interested professors,
judges and lawyers all of the conversations, arguments and decisions of
juries in six federal cases-without the jurors being aware of it.
"The idea has been to tap in on jurors in every state, find out
how the system might be 'improved.'
"Then the lid blew off, when senators learned about it. Now juries,
at least in federal courts, probably will be protected by federal law
against eavesdropping."
The wire tapping of the juries was all the more reprehensible because it
had the prior approval of the court.
Grand Jurors in Pennsylvania must take the following oath:
that you will diligently inquire and true presentment make
of such articles, matters, and things as shall be given you in charge, or
otherwise come to your knowledge in the present service. That the Com-
monwealth's counsel, your fellows, and your own, you will keep se-
cret. That you will present no one from hatred or malice, neither will
you leave any one unpresented for fear, favor, affection, hope of re-
ward or gain, but will present all things truly, as they come to your
knowledge, according to the best of your understanding." 8
Sadler says "The form of oath is of ancient origin, and is preserved at least in
substance."
* Ph. B. and M.A. Dickinson College; LL.B. Dickinson School of Law; Member of the Gen-
eral Assembly, House of Representatives; Member of the Pennsylvania Bar.
1 See House Bill No. 726-Pennsylvania General Assembly-1955-Already passed the House
135-33 and now in the Senate.
2 October 21, 1955, p. 28.
8 SADLER, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN PENNSYLVANIA par. 219, p. 265 (2d ed. 1937).
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The Superior Court of Pennsylvania however in Commonwealth v. Kirk,'
states the oath to be of statutory origin in Pennsylvania:
". .. [W] e may further state that the statutory authority for the
secrecy of the grand jury proceedings in this Commonwealth goes back
to an act of the Provincial Assembly passed in 1696, entitled 'The
Frame of the Government,' which is found in 'Charter to William Penn
and Laws of the Province of Pennsylvania.' . . . It is sometimes er-
roneously entitled 'The Duke of Yorke's Book of Laws'. • . 'The Form
of the Grand Inquest's Attest shall be in these words, viz: Thou shalt
diligently inquire and true presentment make of all such matters and
things, as shall be given thee in charge, or come to thy knowledge,
touching this present service. The Kings Counsel, (thy) fellows and
thy own, thou shalt keep secret, & in all things thou shalt present the
truth, the whole truth & nothing but the truth to the best of thy
knowledge.'
Numerous reasons have been assigned for this rule of secrecy. The Superior
Court in the Kirk Case cites Professor Wigmore on the reasons for the rule:
(a) The Grand Jurors themselves are to be secured in freedom from the ap-
prehension that their opinions and votes may be subsequently disclosed by com-
pulsion. (b) The complainants and the witnesses summoned are to be secured
in fredom from the apprehension that their testimony may be subsequently dis-
closed by compulsion, and this in order that the state may secure willing wit-
nesses. (c) The guilty accused is not to be provided with such clues as will enable
him to flee from arrest or to suborn false testimony or tamper with witnesses.
(d) The innocent accused, who is charged by complaint before the jury, but is
exonerated by their refusal to indict, is entitled to be protected from the com-
pulsory disclosure of the fact that he had been groundlessly accused. In his dis-
cussion, Professor Wigmore shows that the third and fourth reasons have no
application to a purely investigating Grand Jury, as distinguished from a regu-
lar or indicting Grand Jury, for in the former there is no accused, guilty or in-
nocent; and as respects the action of a regular Grand Jury upon the innocent
accused, the public character of our records discloses all persons who are ac-
cused, and a return of "ignoramus" or "not a true bill", is the very best vindi-
cation one can have."
Other reasons have been stated as follows: 6
"To promote freedom of deliberation and opinion among the Grand
ury, which would be impaired, if it were known that the part taken
y each, might be disclosed to the accused or his friends.
"If the oath of secrecy were honestly observed, it would save the
Grand Jury from the importunities (to say nothing more), of the ac-
cused and his friends, to dismiss the complaint or reconsider the find-
ing. This 'ploughing' with the Grand Jury, at least in some localities,
has assumed alarming frequency and boldness."
4 141 Pa. Super. 123, 14 A.2d 914 (1940).
5 WINFIELD, GRAND JURY 22, 23 (2d ed. 1928).
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Another compelling reason is stated by Chief Justice Stern:6 citing United
States v. American Medical Association,
7
.. where defendants moved for an investigation of proceedings
before the Grand Jury, alleging, inter alia, improper conduct on the
part of the government attorneys and stating that some members of the
Grand Jury had indicated a willingness to talk with defendants' counsel
concerning such matters, it was held by the court (in refusing the mo-
tion). . . . The effect of granting such a motion would be to break
down all leeal checks against technical, dilatory tactics. The strong pre-
sumption oi the regularity of Grand Jury proceedings would no longer
prevail. . . . Every accused could upon the flimsiest pretext enlist
the court's aid in a 'fishing expedition', to discover some supposed ir-
regularity to use as a basis for dilatory action; to call over the evidence
and get the government's case against him in advance of trial; to di-
vert and turn back the course of a criminal case from a trial of himself
to a trial of the Grand Jury and the prosecuting officers. . . . There
could be no effective way of guarding against the manifold abuses that
such a practice would encourage. . . it must be remembered that sound
reasons of public policy in the administration of justice lie back of
the rules which for id free access to these channels of information."
It is true that some inroads have been made upon the rule of secrecy, with
a resulting number of established exceptions. Thus a Grand Juror has been
held to be a competent witness to prove who the prosecutor was,8 or to con-
tradict the testimony of a witness as to what she testified to before the Grand
Jury,9 or to testify that the indictment was based solely upon testimony heard
by the Grand Jury in another case against another person.10
Irrespective of the number of exceptions to the secrecy rule, the courts1'
have said it must be conceded that exceptions to the rule shall not be carried
so far as to conflict with the juror's oath.
"He shall not testify (a) how he or any member of the jury vot-
ed, (b) nor what opinion any of them expressed in relation thereto,
(c) nor to the act of either which might invalidate the finding of
the jury. His action, and the action of his fellow-jurors, must be shown
only by the returns which they make to the Court."
Where the District Attorney remained in the Grand Jury room during de-
liberations the court said: 12
"The district attorney is the attendant of the grand jury; it is his
duty as well as his privilege to lay before them matters upon which
6 Comm. v. Smart. 368 Pa. 630, 84 A.2d 782 (1951).
7 United States v. American Medical Association, 26 F. Supp. 429, 431 (D.C.D. 1939).
8 Huidekoper v. Cotton, 3 Watts 56 (Pa. 1834).
9 Gordon v. Comm., 92 Pa. 216 (1879); Comm. v. Carr, 137 Pa. Super. 546, 10 A.2d 133
(1939).
10 Comm. v. Green, 126 Pa. 531 (1889); Comm. v. McComb, 157 Pa. 611 (1893); Comm.
v. Ross, 58 Pa. Super. 412 (1914).
11 Gordon v. Comm., 92 Pa. 216 (1879); Comm. v. Kirk, 141 Pa. Super. 123, 14 A.2d 914
(1940); Comm. v. Grestman, 64 Pa. Super. 484 (1916).
12 Comm. v. Bradney, 126 Pa. 199 (1889).
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they are to pass, to aid them in their examinatoin of witnesses, and
to give them such general instruction as they may require. But it is his
duty during the discussion of the particular case, and whilst the jurors
are deliberating upon it, to remain silent. It is for the jury alone to
consider the evidence and to apply it to the case in hand; any attempt
on the part of the district attorney to influence their action or to give
effect to the evidence adduced, is in the highest degree improper and im-
pertinent. Indeed, it is the better practice, and the jurors have an un-
doubted right to require, that he should retire from the room during
their deliberations upon the evidence and when the vote is taken whether
or not an indictment shall be found or a presentment made."
The rule of secrecy of jury deliberations applies also to Petit and Traverse
Juries and civil cases.
In Hunsicker v. Waidelich,'3 the judge entered the jury room in the absence of
counsel and, while the jury was deliberating, said, "How are you getting along?"
One of the jurors said, "All right." The Judge then said, "All right, I will
wait". Although the court held that the circumstances of this particular oc-
currence did not constitute reversible error, it did say:
"We cannot, however, express too forcibly our disapproval of
his action in invading the secrecy of the jury room. Instructions to the
jury must be given in open court in the presence of the parties or their
counsel. There may be no private communication of any kind or char-
acter between the judge and the jury, and if additional instructions are
needed they must be given in open court. The trial judge should not,
under any circumstances, enter the jury room, however innocent and
proper the purpose may be... There is no way of determining the
influence which such act might have on the minds of the jury, and the
only safe course is to avoid all questions by strictly adhering to the long
established practice which requires all deliberations by the jury to be
conducted in the utmost privacy."
In Cluggage v. Swan,' 4 where an attempt was made to impeach the verdict
by the testimony of the jurors themselves, Mr. Justice Yeates said:
"I frankly confess, that I feel the utmost repugnance to such testi-
mony. By admitting it (testimony of jurors to impeach their verdict)
I as readily perceive, that I should open a door to the exercise of the
most pernicious arts, and tampering with jurors; and that the practice
would be replete with dangerous consequences. Jurors, who have been
sworn or solemnly affirmed to give a verdict according to the evidence,
come with a bad grace into a tribunal of justice to prove their own dis-
honorable conduct, and affix a stigma on their companions who may be
unheard in their defense. Besides, in the language of some of the cases,
I cannot see how such testimony could be heard by the court, without
proceeding against the jurors criminally. . . But above all, I greatly
fear that the practice if adopted, would tend to an inquisition over the
consciences of jurors, as the grounds and reasons of their verdict, and
18 302 Pa. 224 (1930).
14 4 Binney 150 (Pa. 1811).
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bring questions of fact more frequently before the court for their de-
cision, than is consistent with sound policy. I am opposed to penetrating
into the recesses of a jury-room, through the instrumentality of jurors,
who are kept together until they have agreed upon their verdict...
I am of opinion, that the testimony of jurors ought not to be admitted
to invalidate their verdicts."
This ruling was re-affirmed in Redmond v. Pittsburgh Rys., 15 with Mr. Jus-
tice Schaffer continuing:
"Speaking through the present Chief Justice (Kephart) ...
we repeated the thought and reaffirmed the policy so long ago an-
nounced by saying: 'What is more important, we cannot accept the
statement of jurors as to what transpired in the jury room as to the
propriety or impropriety of a juror's conduct. To do so, would destroy
the security of all verdicts and go far toward weakening the efficacy
of trial by jury, so well grounded in our system of jurisprudence. Jurors
cannot impeach their own verdict. Their deliberations are secret and
their inviolability must be closely guarded."
So when the 1874 and all prior Constitutions of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania' 6 says: "Trial by jury shall be as heretofore", certainly one of the
elements of "heretofore" must be that jury deliberations be secret, and that they
be kept secret.
Beyond both the State and Federal Constitutions we hear the patron saint
of the common law, Blackstone 17 referring to trial by jury as "a trial that hath
been used time out of mind in this nation (England) and seems to have been
coeval with the first civil government thereof."
Repp, a Danish Jurist 18 observes: "Respecting the antiquity of juries, per-
haps we ought to say nothing more than this, that their origin lies beyond the
age of clear history."
It can't happen here! Well it did happen here in America, and all because
certain judges whom we commissioned as sentinels to stand guard over our
delicate and priceless fabric of freedom saw fit to desert their post of duty, aid-
ed and abetted by certain reformers (maybe), exploiters (perhaps), who for
the first time since the memory of man runneth not to the contrary, saw fit
to penetrate the sacred curtain of secrecy of the jury room.
Their idea was to try it in every state in the union. Well, they have not
tried it in Pennsylvania, as yet, and in an attempt to make sure that they can't
do it or even try it in this Commonwealth, the writer introduced House Bill
No. 1894, which at the time of this writing is on the third reading calendar in
the House of Representatives which provides:
15 329 Pa. 302 (1938).
16 PA. CoNsT. art. 1, § 6 (1874).
17 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *349.
18 Referred to in MOSCHZISKER, TRluL By JuRY, 13, 14.
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"Whoever by any scheme or device or in any manner, for any pur-
pose, listens into or attempts to listen into the deliberations of any
Jury, Grand, Petit or Traverse shall be guilty of a felony and upon con-
viction thereof shall be sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding $10,000
or undergo imprisonment not exceeding 10 years or both."
In this connection it is interesting to note19 that "anciently it was held that
if one of the Grand Jury disclosed to any person indicted the evidence that
appeared against him, he was thereby made accessory to the offense, if felony,
and in treason a principal." This might be a just punishment for those who
eavesdrop.
As to the reasons advanced for the tapping of jury deliberations; reform
(maybe), exploitation (perhaps). Improvement-In this I must confess full
agreement with the statement of G. K. Chesterton 20 that:
"Our civilization has decided, and very justly decided, that de-
termining the guilt or innocence of men is a thing too important to be
trusted to trained men. It wishes for light upon that awful matter, it
asks men who know no more law than I know, but who can feel the
things I felt in the Jury box. When it wants a library catalogued, or
the solar system discovered, or any trifle of that kind, it uses its spec-
ialists. But when it wishes anything done which is really serious, it
collects 12 of the ordinary men standing around. The same thing was
done, if I remember right, by the Founder of Christianity."
Permit me to conclude with the words of Representative Israel Washburn
of Maine, spoken in the House of Representatives on March 14, 1856, In Re
Kansas Contested Election:21
"Trial by jury, the palladium of civil right and personal security,
born of the conflicts of liberty with despotism, and baptised in the
blood of men struggling to be free, consecrated in our hearts as the
ancient and indefeasible heritage of the people . .. , stands against
all assaults."
Let's keep it that way.
19 WINFIELD, GRAND JURY 22, 23 (2d ed. 1928).
20 The Twelve Men, in TREMENDOUS TRIFLES.
21 IV GREAT DEBATES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 236.
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